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Abstract 
Utilizing neoclassical growth framework augmented with institutional controls and latest estimation 
technique in panel data analysis, this study identifies the crucial institutional qualities in East Asian and 
other developing countries and uncovers the channel of their effects toward economic growth. 
Furthermore, it extends the empirical evidence on the institutional importance toward economic growth in 
the developing countries particularly the East Asian countries which, apart from Rodrik (1997) and 
Campos and Nugent (1999), have somehow been left out from the empirical investigation. 
Keywords: Institutions, economic growth, Asian Financial Crisis, dynamic panel 
analysis, generalized methods of moments. 
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1. Introduction  
This study investigates East Asian development over the past 25 years and uncovers the 
link between institutions and economic performance in the region. The East Asian 
countries have experienced a dramatic economic performance in the 1990s but this 
stellar achievement came to an abrupt end when the Asian financial crisis hit in 1997. 
Empirically, there are only two studies i.e. Rodrik (1997) and Campos and Nugent 
(1999) that found evidence of the significance of institutions to the region’s economic 
performance, however they are for the period before the crisis. As far as the period after 
crisis there is no evidence that we are aware of. 
This study extends the existing literature on institutions in general and East Asian 
economic performance in particular, in two ways. Firstly, it gives an explicit focus on 
East Asian economic development especially for the post-crisis period. Secondly, it 
formalizes the channel of institutional effect on growth by employing the neoclassical 
growth framework containing a shift parameter that is capable of accounting for the 
impacts of numerous factors (including institutions) on total factors productivity. 
Overall, this study finds empirical support for the notion that “institutions matter”. 
Specifically it shows that two institutional qualities i.e. security of property rights and 
bureaucratic quality matter significantly for growth in all developing countries 
including the East Asian countries. The results also lend evidence to the strong 
government hypothesis in the East Asian region as political institutions are also found to 
have significant growth-effects in the region. Meanwhile, during the period of high 
growth in the region throughout the year 1984-1996, secure property rights and strong 
governments emerge as the significant growth determinants while for period post-Asian 
financial crisis 1997-1998, no clear evidence of the institutional impact on growth is 
found. 
This study is organized as  follows: this introduction being the first, Section 2 reviews 
the East Asian economic growth and its institutions. Section 3 discusses the 
methodology and data sources, followed by Section 4 where the estimation results are 
presented. Section 5 concludes. 
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2.  The East Asian economic growth and institutions 
The rise of East Asian economic power during the last four decades has been dramatic. 
Six fastest-growing East Asian economies were China, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Taiwan and they realised about 5 percent per capita growth annually 
between 1965 and 1995. Besides, three other high-performing economies were 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand and their economic growth was about 3.5 percent per 
year during the same period. Foreign trade growth of the nine countries had been 
similarly remarkable. From 1965-1990 these countries had increased their share of total 
world exports from 8 to 18 percent and their respective share of manufactured exports 
from 9 to 21 percent (Ahrens, 2002).  
The phenomenal economic performance during the period 1960s to 1990s was once 
dubbed as “the East Asian Miracle” by the World Bank (1993) and the world body had 
hailed these countries’ growth model as the blueprint to be emulated by other 
developing countries seeking higher growth. The model emphasizes policies ensuring 
stability in macroeconomic fundamentals, setting correct prices, liberalizing the 
economy and developing the private sector as the engine of growth
1
.  
Apart from the conventional studies explaining the sources of economic growth in East 
Asia
2
, there are studies that propose the dramatic economic performance the region has 
seen in the 1990s could have possibly been the result of several institutional factors (see 
for example theoretical analyses by Ahrens, 2002 –strong and authoritarian East Asian 
governments; Gonzalez and Mendoza, 2001 –well-functioning public institutions)3.  
Empirically, Rodrik (1997) finds evidence on the significance of institutions to the 
                                                 
1
 These are essentially the reform policies advocated by international organizations (like the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund) that many policy makers regard as “The Washington Consensus”. 
In general, it consists of price liberalization strategy, unfettered international trade, firms privatization and 
stabilization policies.   
2
 These studies can be divided into two strands of argument. One strand subscribes to the “accumulation 
view” and claims that growth in East Asian countries was mainly driven by the high rates of capital 
formation (see Young  (1995), Krugman (1995), Collins and Bosworth (1996), Sarel (1997) and Senhadji 
(2000) and Han et al. (2002)). Whereas, the other strand adheres to the “assimilation view” and argues 
that essential component of East Asian high growth rates was the acquisition and mastery of foreign 
technology (see Nelson and Pack (1999), Easterly and Levine (2002), Iwata et al. (2002). 
3
 As far as the institutional impact on growth is concerned, on overall, it is fair to say that the institutional 
literature has already arrived at the academic consensus with strong empirical evidence supporting 
“institutions matter for growth” proposition. See for example influential studies by Hall and Jones (1999), 
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2005), and Rodrik et al. (2004). 
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economic success of the high-performing East Asian economies as he shows an index of 
subjective institutional indicators is exceptionally well-suited for rank-ordering these 
countries with respect to their growth performance. His model specification containing 
only initial income, initial education, and institutional quality accounts for virtually all 
of the variation in growth performance among these economies even when the quality 
of institutions is instrumented by using the exogenous determinants. Similarly, Campos 
and Nugent (1999) show that governance characteristics in the East Asian and Latin 
American countries are able to explain the economic performance in the regions for 
period 1972-1995. Specifically they find quality of bureaucracy have played a 
prominent role in improving the performance in East Asian countries, and rule of law in 
Latin American countries.  
In 1997, the region’s dream growth however came to an abrupt end when the financial 
crisis struck
4
. As discussed in the literature on the East Asian crisis, the possible causes 
to the crisis are unsustainable deterioration in macroeconomic fundamentals and poor 
economic policies (Corsetti et al., 1998; Frankel, 1998), moral hazard induced by 
implicit government guarantees (Krugman, 1998), and financial panic (Radelet and 
Sach, 1998). Meanwhile, the World Bank (1998) suggests that institutional failures such 
as weakness in financial regulation and corporate governance are among the causes of 
the crisis. Besides, Lanyi and Lee (1999) and Lingle (2000) argue that the absence of 
transparency and accountability and too much intervention and politicisation from the 
autocratic government are the main causes that render the countries vulnerable to crisis. 
The key institutional characteristics in East Asian economies can be grouped into three 
broad categories i.e. property rights, bureaucratic efficiency
5
, and political institutions, 
and the characteristics are: (a) Authoritarian governments implementing interventionist 
policies to spur growth –such as privatisation, industrialisation and liberalisation 
policies to enhance private sector-growth driven (political institutions), (b) Strong 
government-business relationship –provision of implicit and explicit government 
guarantees to loan and subsidies to specific industries (political institutions), (c) Well-
                                                 
4
 Undoubtedly, the East Asian Financial crisis has taken many by surprise with unpredictably large 
decline of the foreign exchange rates, heavy losses in the foreign exchange reserves, large scale of capital 
flights, and huge decline in the share prices and other financial assets in the affected countries. 
5
 Bureaucratic efficiency is apparently one of the many institutional qualities that support the existence of 
secure property rights environment. In this study however, it is considered a separate quality from 
property rights institutions to allow an explicit identification of the well-functioning public institutions 
and bureaucracy quality previously shown to support economic growth in the East Asian region. 
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protected property rights –lower risks of contracts repudiation and expropriation of 
private property (property rights), (d) Well-functioning public institutions and 
bureaucracy quality (bureaucratic efficiency). 
On the other hand, a number of “bad” institutions could exist as a consequence of the 
above institutional characteristics, such as: (a) Legal enforcement is probably lacking 
due to relationship-based system  (lacking rule of law –property rights), (b) Inflexibility 
of the institutional settings and macroeconomic policy making system due to autocratic 
government (less democratic government, bureaucratic inefficiency –political 
institutions, bureaucracy efficiency), (c) Transparency and accountability issues such as 
corruption (property rights). 
3. Methodology and data sources 
Consider the following Cobb-Douglas function, based on Dawson (1998)
6
, which 
exhibits constant returns to scale but diminishing return to individual factors:  
  1)( itititit LAKY  (1) 
where α < 1, and Y is the real output, produced by K , the physical capital, and L , the 
amount of labour. A represents a labour-augmenting technology and is assumed to grow 
exogenously at rate g. The standard derivation of steady state income per capita 
function then will be: 
 ititit gnsgtAy 








 ln
1
ln
1
lnln 0  (2) 
where its  represents physical capital, n is the rate of population growth, g is 
technological progress and δ is depreciation rate all of which are constant and 
exogenous for any period.  
                                                 
6
 Dawson (1998) however utilizes Mankiw et al. (1992) growth model which is a Solow (1956) 
neoclassical growth model augmented with human capital. In his panel analysis, Dawson divides his data 
into three 5-year subperiods because the data for institutional quality (i.e. economic freedom) and human 
capital only available in five-year period. Since this study uses annual data, it therefore employs Solow 
framework and leaves out human capital parameter.  
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The primary motivation to use Solow framework is particularly due the fact that it has a 
shift parameter, A, that according to Mankiw et al. (1992), reflects not just labour-
augmenting technology, but also other factors such as resource endowments, climate, 
institutions, and so on (institutions term is added to the list by Campos and Nugent 
(1998)). Therefore, the notion of institutions affecting total factor productivity can be 
explicitly incorporated in the model via a function of A, such as:  
itIgt
it eAA
 0  (3) 
Dawson (1998) argues the specification of the A function as above implies differences 
in institutions have an explicit impact on the level of productivity across countries. One 
important assumption in this specification is that institutions are considered to affect 
growth via the total factor productivity channel and not via the investment term, its  and 
therefore measures of both institutions and investment should be statistically 
significant
7
 in a growth estimation. Thus, a growth model based on Equation (1) 
incorporated with Equation (3) can be conveniently derived as follows: 
 itititit gnsIgtAy 



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

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1
lnln 0  (4) 
The functional form of Equation (4) with appropriate error term and country- and time-
specific effect terms is therefore specified as follows: 
  ittiitititititit gnsIyyy    lnlnlnlnln 4321101  (5) 
where β’s are the parameters to be estimated. Equation (5) presents a heuristic way of 
testing the institutional effects on growth via its impact on factors productivity.  
                                                 
7
 If institutions primarily affect investment and therefore indirectly affecting growth (via investment 
channel), the Solow framework could therefore be extended to include institutions via its as a function of 
institutions i.e. )(Ifs  and 0)(
' If . However, the implication from this specification is that, if it is 
true institutions affect growth via investment channel only, it will be redundant to include both 
investment and institutions as regressors in a growth model. Investment (as a proximate growth 
determinant) should therefore be omitted. On the other hand, if institutions affect growth only partially 
via investment channel, omitting investment would not be appropriate as important information would be 
lost (see Dawson (1998) for more discussion on the possible channel of institutional impact towards 
growth and the consequent assumptions need to be made). 
7 
 
In this study, we employ panel data system GMM method developed by Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to estimate Equation (5)
8
. This method is 
able to correct unobserved country heterogeneity, omitted variable bias, measurement 
error, and potential endogeneity that frequently affect growth estimation (Bond et al. 
2001). It combines in a system the relevant regressions expressed in first-differences 
and in levels. First-differencing checks for unobserved heterogeneity and omitted 
variable bias, as well as for time-invariant component of the measurement error. It also 
corrects endogeneity bias (time-varying component) via instrumenting the explanatory 
variables. Instruments for differenced equations are obtained from values (levels) of 
explanatory variables lagged at least twice, and instruments for levels equations are 
lagged differences of the variable. Estimating two equations in a system GMM reduced 
potential bias and imprecision associated with a simple first-difference GMM estimator 
(Arrellano and Bover, (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998)).  
Consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instruments. As 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and 
Bond (1998), two specification tests are used. Firstly, Sargan/Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions which tests for overall validity of the instruments and the null 
hypothesis is that all instruments as a group are exogenous. The second test examines 
the null hypothesis that error term it  of the differenced equation is not serially 
correlated particularly at the second order (AR2)
9
 Ones should not reject the null 
hypothesis of both tests.  
For this study, an annual panel observation for 69 developing countries in three regions 
namely Asia, Africa and Latin America for a period of 25 years (1984-2008)
10
. Data on 
                                                 
8
 For additional robustness check, as far as the results are concerned, we also estimate Equation (5) using 
cross sectional (Pooled Ordinary Least Square-Pooled OLS) and panel fixed effect methods. The 
estimation using these methods will also afford an appropriate comparison with previous institutional 
studies, such as Rodrik et al. (2004) and Glaeser et al. (2004), that rely on such method. Results for 
Pooled OLS and fixed effects estimations are available upon request. 
9
 By construction, the differenced error term is probably serially correlated at first-order even if the 
original error is not. While most studies that employ GMM dynamic estimation report the test for first 
order serial correlation, some do not. 
10
 The reason we choose annual data for this study is mainly because of the fact that throughout the 25-
year period, developing countries in the three regions have undoubtedly experienced unique economic 
development (including a series of growth and crises episodes) and we are of the opinion that annual 
observation would therefore allow maximum variations in the data to be captured. Furthermore, the focus 
of this study is to investigate the possible link institutions have to these growth and crisis episodes, 
particularly for the region of interest, East Asia. Apparently average data is only suitable if we are 
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real GDP per capita and population growth are obtained from World Development 
Indicators (WDI) from the World Bank (2009). We conveniently follow Mankiw, et al. 
(1992), Islam (1995), Caselli et al. (1996) and Hoeffler (2002) to assume exogenous 
technological change plus depreciation rate as 0.05. Similarly, we follow them to use 
investment share of real GDP per capita as a proxy for physical capital and the 
investment data are obtained from Penn World Table 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009)
 11
.  
In the previous discussion on East Asian growth and institutions, the key institutional 
characteristics are loosely clustered into three groups i.e. property rights, bureaucracy 
quality, and political institutions. To measure these institutional quality parameters, we 
utilize indicators from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) provided by the 
PRS Group (2009)
12
 and Polity IV by Marshall and Jaggers (2008)
13
. Both datasets are 
conceptually able to proxy the three dimensions of institutional quality previously 
shown to be present in developing countries under study particularly in the region of 
interest, East Asia. Furthermore, ICRG and Polity IV data are available for the whole 
period under study which makes them preferable to other data
14
.  
Six indicators from ICRG and one from Polity IV are used to measure three dimensions 
of institutional quality and they are grouped as follows: (a) Security of property rights –
                                                                                                                                               
interested in the long run growth relationship to institutions. Nevertheless, system GMM is shown to 
perform relatively well for panel observation with large N and small T (see Roodman, 2009b) and studies 
utilizing system GMM invariably use averaged data to ensure that they have N>T. In case when N<T, the 
empirical strength of the method could be compromised. We will return to this matter when discussing 
the estimation results in Section 4. 
11
 The choice of annual data therefore excludes human-capital variable in the growth framework of this 
study since data on human capital are available only in 5-year period. 
12
 See Knack and Keefer (1995) who first introduce ICRG data and they argue that the data are better and 
more suitable to measure institutions based on property rights than political violence variables or Gastil 
indices of civil liberties and political rights.  
13
 Polity IV data is compiled via Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 
1800-2008, which is an annual, cross-national, time-series and polity-case formats coding democratic and 
autocratic "patterns of authority" and regime changes in all independent countries with total population 
greater than 500,000 in 2008 (163 countries in 2008). Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) encourage the use of 
Polity IV data including executive constraints variable which is able to satisfactorily account for the 
constraints placed on politicians and elites in a country.   
14
 Alternative datasets are such as the Worldwide Governance Index (from the World Bank), Economic 
Freedom of the World (by the Fraser Institute) and Freedom in the World index or Gastil index (by the 
Freedom House). World Bank Governance Index (Kaufmann et al, 2009) available every two years since 
for 1996-2000 and annually from 2002-2008, while Economic Freedom of the World data from the Fraser 
Institute only available 5-yearly from 1970-2000 and annually from 2001-2007. Gastil index of political 
rights measuring democracy available for the whole period under study, but Knack and Keefer (1995) 
argue that the data have been compiled without explicit aim of measuring security of property rights, and 
many of its dimensions are not closely related to property rights. 
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Investment Profile
15
, Law and Order, Corruption; (b) Bureaucratic efficiency –
Bureaucracy Quality and Government Stability; and (c) Political Institutions –
Democratic Accountability and Polity2
16
. 
4. Estimation results and discussions 
The general assumptions for the system GMM regression are as follows: we treat lagged 
dependent variable as predetermined variable and both investment and population 
growth as potentially endogenous variables. Similarly, we assume all institutional 
variables are endogenous since reverse causality from growth to institutions is possible. 
We use lag two of lagged dependent variable, investment, and population growth as 
instruments for the variables, and lag three to five as instruments for the institutional 
variables
17
. This is arguably a crucial assumption in system GMM estimation in order to 
eliminate endogeneity bias. With this assumption, we postulate that, once the steady 
state determinants are controlled for, growth-effect of institutions would originate from 
the state of institutions in the past three to five years to cause an inter-temporal 
influence on the current institutions. We follow Bond et al. (2001) to employ one-step 
GMM estimators since efficiency gain from two-step GMM estimators is shown by 
Bond et al. to be small, and the two-step estimator normally converge to its asymptotic 
distribution relatively slowly, and in finite sample its asymptotic standard errors can be 
seriously biased downwards thus making it unreliable
18
. 
Furthermore, we employ a two-stage regression strategy for system GMM estimation 
with the ultimate objective of identifying the institutional quality that truly matters for 
growth in the developing countries under study. Firstly we begin with the estimation of 
                                                 
15
 It is a merged version of Government Repudiation of Contracts and Risk of Expropriation indicators 
previously found in ICRG data (IRIS dataset version). Refer Knack and Keefer (1995). 
16
 By construction, Polity2 indicator reflects institutionalised democracy if it receives higher score, and 
institutionalised autocracy if lower score. Therefore, positive estimated coefficient for Polity2 variable is 
interpreted as the effect of democracy and negative coefficient as the effect of autocracy. 
17
 These sets of lag are finally chosen after a series of attempts involving multiple combinations of lag 
were made in running the system GMM regression. The decision to use these sets of lag is because they 
yield the best results as far as the significance of the steady state determinants and institutional variables 
as well as the strength of diagnostic test of the regressions are concerned. Recall that the dynamic panel 
GMM regression is capable of identifying the relevant and valid instruments from the endogenous 
variables’ lagged values. Therefore the decision on the lag numbers has to be made depending on the best 
results obtained from the regression.  
18
 Windmeijer (2005) provides correction to this problem to achieve robust standard errors in two-step 
GMM estimation. Since we already enforce heterokedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard error in 
the one-step GMM estimation, we therefore consider only one-step GMM estimation. 
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general model that contains all institutional variables, after controlling for the steady 
state determinants, to determine the variables’ significance. In the second stage, we re-
estimate the growth model but now with only significant repressors identified in the first 
stage. A similar strategy is applied for the Asian sample. Table 1 below presents the 
results of the estimation. 
Based on the overall results, the convergence hypothesis is strongly supported with 
negative coefficients for the lagged dependent variable particularly in the Asian sample 
estimations where the coefficients are significant at 5%. Investment is consistently 
statistically significant and positive across all estimations
19
. Population growth however 
has mixed results i.e. positive significant for general sample but negative insignificant 
in Asian sample.    
For general sample estimations (model (1)), Investment Profile, Law and Order, 
Government Stability remains statistically significant at 1% and 5% level as previously 
found in cross sectional and fixed effect estimations. As for political institutions 
variable, Polity2 is significant. In model (2), their importance is further tested and the 
results show all variables except Polity2 survive. On overall, therefore, secure property 
rights environment and efficient bureaucracy are the important institutional 
characteristics that matter to the economic growth in developing countries for the whole 
period under study. This finding therefore extends the existing evidence documented in 
the literature on the positive effect of institutions towards growth.  
In the Asian sample in model (3) i.e. the general estimation, Investment Profile, 
Government Stability and Polity2 emerge significant at at least 10% confidence level. 
To confirm this findings, we re-estimate the model, i.e. model (4), with the three 
variables as the only institutional regressors considered. All three institutional variables 
remain significant and whilst Government Stability now has an increased significance 
level, Investment Profile and Polity2 have somehow lesser significance level. 
                                                 
19
 We compare the size of investment coefficients in the estimation of model (1) in Table 1 with a model 
with only steady state determinants without institutional controls, and a decrease in investment size of 
effect is detected. This finding, coupled with significant institutional variables in growth estimation of 
model (1), clearly supports the assumption we make earlier that institutions affect growth via factor 
productivity channel and not via investment.  
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Interestingly, the negative coefficient for Polity2 variable remains and lends some 
credence to the strong government hypothesis presented by Ahrens (2002)
20
. 
The findings of these estimations arguably give sufficiently robust empirical evidence 
that there are two aspects of institutions namely secure property rights (reflected by 
Investment Profile and Law and Order variables) and bureaucratic efficiency (by 
Government Stability variable) that matter to growth in developing countries. 
Meanwhile, in the East Asian countries, in addition to the above two qualities, political 
institutions (reflected by Polity2 variable) is also a significant determinant that influence 
the countries’ economic growth.  
The results of the previous estimations therefore clearly distinguish a set of prominent 
institutional characteristics that matter to the growth in developing countries including 
the East Asian countries. It is interesting to note that on overall Investment Profile and 
Government Stability emerge as the key growth determinant since both variables 
survive all model specifications either in general or Asian sample. Therefore, these 
results confirm the finding by Rodrik (1997) on the important secure property rights 
environment and the finding by Campos and Nugent (1999) on the prominent role of 
bureaucracy quality in East Asian economic performance. Similarly, this finding also 
lend empirical support to Gonzalez and Mendoza (2001) hypothesis that well-
functioning public institutions and good governance are the reasons behind dramatic 
economic in East Asian region.   
Another important finding is the consistently negative coefficient for the Polity2 
variable particularly in the estimation of East Asian sample therefore indicating 
institutionalised autocracy matter for growth in the region
21
. Conceptually, institutional 
variables should have a positive relationship to income growth to indicate the better the 
institutional settings; the higher income could be attained. In the theoretical discussion 
on East Asian economic performance earlier, we show that strong and autocratic 
government that is able to govern the markets and pursue (and enforce) pro-growth 
policies is the underlying reason behind the countries’ dramatic economic success. The 
                                                 
20
 The negative coefficients for Polity2 variable are also found in Pooled OLS and fixed effects 
estimations, results are available upon request. 
21
 Recall again in footnote 16, Polity2 reflects institutionalised autocracy if the coefficient’s sign is 
negative. 
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finding in this section therefore essentially gives empirical support to the strong 
government hypothesis.  
As far as the empirical performance of system GMM estimation in this study is 
concerned, it seems to be reasonably satisfactory and robust, particularly the estimation 
for the general sample. The test for first order serial correlation in the residuals AR(1) 
show that null hypothesis of no first order serial correlation is overwhelmingly rejected 
in all estimations. For the whole-country sample, the estimations has no problem of 
second order serial correlation since AR(2) test statistics are unable to reject the null of 
no second order serial correlation  (p-value of 0.104 and 0.091
22
 for model (1) and (2), 
respectively). On the contrary, test for second order serial correlation AR(2) in Asian 
sample indicates there is a possibility of such a problem as the null hypothesis is 
completely rejected. This particular inconsistency is highly likely because of too large T 
(recall that we utilize annual data from 1984-2008, hence T=25) and too small number 
of countries in Asian sample i.e. N=14 thus making T>N. This situation could have 
possibly caused some of the lags to be invalid instruments
23
.  
The Hansen test for overidentification  indicates the null of exogenous instruments is 
accepted with p-value equal to 1.000. Nevertheless, the implausibly good p-value of 
1.000 for Hansen J test should be interpreted with caution since the test is apparently 
weakened by a high number of instruments
24
. Roodman (2009a) notes that the number 
of instruments in difference and system GMM estimations is quadratic in the time 
dimension of the panel. High numbers of instruments would cause several problems 
especially for sample with large T. Although we limit the instrument lags, the variables 
we assume as predetermined (lag dependent variable) and endogenous (investment, 
population growth, and institutional variables) that need instrumenting are always 
present in every model specification throughout the estimation process. Our sample data 
of 25 years would undoubtedly generate huge number of instruments (as high as 699 in 
                                                 
22
 Rejection of null of the presence of second order serial correlation, or AR(2),  at 1% and 5% levels is 
considered satisfactory, according to Cameron and Trivedi (2010). 
23
 This can be considered as a trade-off between utilizing annual observation for capturing maximum 
variations in the data, and the consequent compromise on the strength of the test diagnostics of the 
method. 
24
 Nevertheless, there are numerous studies employing system GMM that report p-value of 1.000 or close 
to 1.000 for Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, see for example Baltagi et al. (2009), Hassan et 
al. (2009), etc. 
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general sample and 296 in Asian sample). For as long as the number of instruments 
higher than number of groups (N), Hansen test will definitely be weakened.  
East Asia is the region of interest in this study due to its unique economic development 
experience in the past 25 years. Thus, we seek to investigate the possible link between 
institutions and growth in the region particularly for the period before and after Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-98. As previously discussed, the episode of high growth and 
unprecedented crisis in the region is arguably an interesting case study for a growth 
analysis from the perspective of institutions. 
The similar strategy of two-stage estimation is applied in this section, and it considers 
two sub-periods from the 25-year sample data, firstly the period of high growth between 
1984-1996 (called pre-Asian financial crisis), and secondly the period when the crisis 
started until the most recent year in the sample data, that is 1997 until 2008 (post-Asian 
financial crisis). The following Table 2 presents the results.   
The results indicate that convergence parameter and investment variables are 
statistically significant with correct sign and consistent size of effects. Population 
growth however is not. Meanwhile, Investment Profile and Polity2 emerge the most 
important institutional characteristics towards growth of the East Asian countries for the 
period before crisis as their significance survives both model specifications (model 5 
and 6) at consistent significant level and coefficient size. As for the Polity2, the 
negative coefficient remains to further corroborate the strong government hypothesis 
previously discussed. As for the Government Stability variable, notwithstanding its 
significance in the previous section estimations, it however turns out insignificant 
across all estimations and yields inconsistent sign.  
On overall, it is fair to say that as far as the period of high growth is considered, 
Investment Profile and Polity2 are the key institutional qualities that have been proven 
to significantly support the achievement of high growth by the East Asian countries. 
This finding confirms the empirical evidence by Rodrik (1997) on the importance of 
secure property rights and gives empirical support to Ahrens’ (2002) proposition of 
strong East Asian government that are able to influence the economic growth in the 
region. In other words, the environment of well-protected property rights and vibrant 
14 
 
investment activities in the East Asian countries are actually the results of the pro-
growth policies implemented by strong and stable government in the Asian countries.  
While the results in pre-crisis period are reasonably straightforward and obvious, the 
estimations for period post-crisis however produce on overall insignificant institutional 
effects on growth. None of the institutional variables are significant across all 
estimations. One possible interpretation to this finding is that somehow during the 
period after crisis, the impact of institutional quality on the economic growth is possibly 
obscured due to the fact these crisis-hit countries were implementing  recovery policies 
and strategies that were specifically designed and tailored to tackle the crisis impacts of 
various severity these countries experienced
25
. We are of the opinion that these differed 
recovery processes and unique development experience between the countries in the 
East Asian region during the period post-crisis has to some extent prevented the analysis 
in this section to uncover any meaningful and significant institutional impact towards 
economic growth.  
                                                 
25
 For example, Malaysia implemented self-designed capital-control-based policies whereas South Korea 
implemented the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recovery strategies, and both countries, despite their 
differed approaches to tackle the crisis impacts, managed to recover somewhat quickly. On the contrary, 
there were also countries like Indonesia for example who has somewhat extended negative growth post-
crisis period (which means delayed recovery) due to political disorder following the downfall of Suharto 
regime (Abidin, 2003). 
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Table 1: System GMM regression of growth model augmented with institutional variables
a
 
Country sample Whole sample: 69 countries Asian sample: 14 countries 
Regression model 
(1) 
All institutional 
variables 
(2) 
Only significant 
institutional variables 
(3) 
All institutional 
variables 
(4) 
Only Significant 
institutional variables 
Constant 0.186  (0.152) 0.198  (0.146) -0.146*  (0.078) -0.149*  (0.074) 
ln (yit-1)  -0.004  (0.004) -0.005  (0.004) -0.013***  (0.004) -0.011**  (0.004) 
ln (sit)  0.025***  (0.007) 0.031***  (0.009) 0.032**  (0.011) 0.035***  (0.009) 
ln (n+g+δ)it 0.112*  (0.063) 0.121**  (0.059) -0.057  (0.035) -0.055  (0.032) 
Investment Profile 0.004***  (0.002) 0.004**  (0.002) 0.004**  (0.002) 0.004*  (0.002) 
Law and Order  0.005**  (0.002) 0.004**  (0.002) 0.001  (0.002)  
Corruption  -0.004  (0.002) 
 
0.001  (0.002)  
Bureaucracy Quality 0.001 (0.001) 
 
0.001  (0.001)  
Government Stability 0.006***  (0.002) 0.006***  (0.002) 0.003*  (0.002) 0.003**  (0.002) 
Democratic Accountability -0.000 (0.001) 
 
0.000  (0.001)  
Polity2 0.002*  (0.001) 0.001  (0.001) -0.002**  (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) 
AR1 p-value 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
AR2 p-value 0.104 0.091 0.007 0.006 
Hansen p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Observations 1548 1548 299 299 
Number of country 68 68 13 13 
No. of instruments 699 457 290 286 
a
 Dependent variable is log real GDP per capita growth. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations include time dummies. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond tests for first-order and second-order autocorrelation in the residuals of differenced equation, 
respectively. Hansen test of overidentification tests for Ho: the instruments as a group are exogenous. ***, **, and * indicate the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 2: System GMM regression of growth model augmented with institutional variables for Asian countries
b
 
Sample period  Pre-Asian financial crisis (1984 – 1996) Post-Asian financial crisis (1997 – 2008) 
Regression model 
(5) 
All institutional variables 
(6) 
Only significant 
institutional variables in 
Asian sample (model 4) 
(7) 
All institutional 
variables 
(8) Only significant 
institutional variables in 
Asian sample (model 4) 
Constant -0.108   (0.066) -0.122**  (0.053) -0.166  (0.100) -0.193  (0.120) 
ln (yit-1) -0.008*  (0.004) -0.008*  (0.004) -0.008*  (0.004) -0.006  (0.004) 
ln (sit) 0.033**  (0.012) 0.034***  (0.010) 0.036***  (0.009) 0.034***  (0.010) 
ln (n+g+δ)it -0.038  (0.028) -0.039  (0.024) -0.060  (0.040) -0.069  (0.047) 
Investment Profile 0.010**  (0.004) 0.011**  (0.004) -0.004  (0.005) -0.002  (0.003) 
Law and Order  -0.002  (0.002) 
 
0.001  (0.003)  
Corruption  0.001  (0.002) 
 
0.002  (0.003)  
Bureaucracy Quality 0.001  (0.001) 
 
0.000  (0.004)  
Government Stability -0.003  (0.004) -0.003  (0.004) 0.007  (0.004) 0.007  (0.005) 
Democratic Accountability -0.000  (0.002) 
 
0.001  (0.002)  
Polity2  -0.004***  (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.001  (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 
AR1 p-value 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 
AR2 p-value 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 
Hansen p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Observations 310 310 311 311 
Number of country 14 14 14 14 
No. of instruments 252 241 199 194 
b
Dependent variable is log Real GDP per capita annual growth. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Time dummies are included in all 
estimations. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano Bond tests for first-order and second order autocorrelation in the residuals, respectively. 
Hansen test of overidentification is the test for Ho: the instruments as a group is exogenous. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
The East Asian countries have experienced a dramatic economic performance since 
early 1990s but an unprecedented financial crisis in 1997-1998 has brought an abrupt 
end to the dream growth, and has resulted in severe recession and delayed recovery for 
some of the previously high performing countries in the region. Utilizing Solow growth 
framework augmented with institutional variables reflecting property rights, 
bureaucratic efficiency and political institutions, and employing latest estimation 
technique and dataset, this study is able to achieve the intended objectives to find 
empirical support to the proposition “institutions matter” for economic growth in 
developing countries and to show that the institutional growth-effect essentially runs via 
total factor productivity channel.  
Specifically, this study finds security of property rights (proxied by Investment Profile 
and Law and Order) and bureaucratic efficiency (proxied by Government Stability 
variable) matter significantly for growth in all developing countries under study 
including the East Asian region and this finding is consistent to different model 
specifications, sample of countries and time periods. In addition to these two aspects of 
institutions, political institutions (proxied Polity2 variable) or specifically strong 
government or institutionalised autocracy (reflected by negative coefficient of Polity2) 
is shown to have important growth-effect for East Asian countries. Meanwhile, secure 
property rights and strong government characteristics are shown to be the key 
institutional quality behind the dramatic growth performance of East Asian countries 
during the period before crisis (1984-1996), whereas post-crisis this study is unable to 
establish any clear evidence on the impact of institutions towards growth. 
Nevertheless, this study finds that the choice of annual data has on overall compromised 
the strength of diagnostics tests of the estimation method, system GMM, which relies 
heavily on the validity instruments obtained from lagged endogenous variables. The 
empirical performance of this study is plagued with the possibility of serial correlation 
problem (since orthogonality conditions between differenced error term and endogenous 
variables are frequently violated) and weakened overidentification test (due to high 
number of instrument count). In spite of these shortcomings, we are of the opinion that 
as far as the objective of identifying the institutional quality that matter to economic 
18 
 
growth in developing countries are concerned, the estimated results particularly in 
general sample estimation (model (1) and (2) in Table 1 that manages to survive serial 
correlation test and Hansen test) have somehow achieved the aim with reasonable 
degree of empirical strength.  
Furthermore, this effort is arguably the first as far as we are aware of that uses dynamic 
panel data analysis to test for institutions-growth linkage in developing countries 
particularly the East Asian countries for the period when significant growth 
achievement and severe financial crisis have happened.  
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